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Abstract 
This  paper  uses  German  evidence  to  address  two  questions  about  corporate 
governance. The effects of ownership on corporate governance have received much 
recent attention, but very little of this has been devoted to the appropriate way to 
measure firm ownership. The results of this paper show that the conclusions reached 
about the effects of ownership on corporate governance can depend critically on the 
particular ownership measure used, and that the widely-used weakest-link principle is 
wholly  unsatisfactory  as  a  means  of  dealing  with  the  issues  raised  by  pyramid 
ownership  structures.  The  paper  also  shows  that  greater  ownership  concentration 
typically  weakens  the  link  between  managerial  pay  and  firm  profitability.  This  is 
inconsistent with the hypothesis, emphasised in the recent literature on the USA, that 
large owners are a complement to, rather than a substitute for, such a link. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The view that managerial pay plays an important role in the solution of the 
agency problem arising from the separation of ownership and control in large firms 
has  recently  been  questioned  by  Bertrand  and  Mullainathan  (2000,  2001)  and 
Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004). These authors argue that managerial pay is higher 
and  less  sensitive  to  firm  performance  in  firms  with  widely-dispersed  ownership, 
where managerial power is greatest, than it is in firms where managerial power is 
limited by the presence of a large outside shareholder or other factors associated with 
good  corporate  governance.  Managerial  pay  does  not,  according  to  Bertrand  and 
Mullainathan and Bebchuk and Fried, provide managers with the strongest incentives 
to act in owners’ interests when firm ownership is widely dispersed, as principal-
agent theory suggests, because in such firms managers essentially set their own pay. 
Rather, “principal-agent models work best [as explanations of managerial pay] when 
there are in fact individuals around to act as principals” (Bertrand and Mullainathan 
2001, p. 929). In other words, linking managerial pay to firm performance is not a 
substitute  for  the  absence  of  large  outside  owners:  instead,  the  presence  of  large 
owners is required for such a link to exist. 
 
The  evidence  adduced  to  support  the  view  that  large  owners  and  other 
indicators  of  good  corporate  governance  are  complementary  to  managerial  pay 
arrangements that link compensation to performance in line with the principal-agent 
model comes from the USA. A natural question to ask, therefore, is whether a similar 
relationship  exists  in  other  economies  with  different  corporate  governance 
characteristics.  This  paper  provides  evidence  on  the  relationship  between  the 
sensitivity  of  managerial  pay  to  firm  performance  and  features  of  corporate 
governance in listed German firms. The German corporate governance system is very 
different  from  that  of  the  USA  or  the  UK.  Listed  firms  in  Germany,  as  in  most 
countries (La Porta et al. 1999), usually have highly concentrated ownership, with 
only  a  small  minority  having  dispersed  ownership.  All  listed  German  firms  are 
required to have both a supervisory and a management board. Responsibility for the 
operation of the firm rests with the management board, whose members cannot also 
serve on the supervisory board. The German Aktiengesetz (Stock Corporation Act) 
specifies that the main function of the supervisory board is control of the management   3 
board, including its appointment, dismissal and remuneration. Codetermination laws 
require that employee representatives should typically comprise either one third or 
one half of the supervisory boards of listed firms. Employees are therefore formally 
able to influence the remuneration of senior managers of listed German firms. Section 
2 of this paper describes these distinctive features of German corporate governance in 
greater detail, and considers how they might be expected to affect the sensitivity of 
managerial pay to firm performance. 
 
The effect of firm ownership structure on pay-performance sensitivity is one 
major concern of this paper. A second objective of the paper is to provide evidence on 
the question of what is the appropriate measure of firm ownership. Recent literature 
has emphasised that owners of firms often exercise control via a chain of other firms – 
a pyramid (La Porta et al. 1999, Claessens et al. 2000, 2002, Faccio et al. 2001, 
Faccio and Lang 2002). However, it is not obvious how to use the voting rights at 
each tier of a pyramid to derive a measure of the control rights of the ultimate owners 
(those at the top of the pyramids). All the studies cited above have used the weakest-
link principle (WLP), which assigns control rights to the ultimate owner on the basis 
of the minimum value of voting rights across the different links of a control chain. 
Despite its popularity in empirical studies, the WLP is an ad hoc measure with no 
theoretical underpinning. We therefore ask both whether there are better measures of 
ultimate ownership than the WLP and whether ownership measured at the ultimate 
level is empirically superior to ownership measured at the first-tier level (i.e., without 
tracing ownership through pyramid structures). Section 3 of the paper discusses the 
issues involved in measuring firm ownership and develops  alternative measures of 
ownership, which are then tested empirically in section 6. 
 
Empirical studies of managerial compensation consistently conclude that the 
elasticity of compensation to firm performance is very low, and that managerial pay is 
more  strongly  affected  by  firm  size  than  by  firm  performance.  Germany  is  no 
exception. Schmid (1997), Schwalbach and Grasshoff (1997), Grasshoff et al. (2000), 
and  Elston  and  Goldberg  (2003)  all  provide  estimates  confirming  this  finding  for 
different samples of German firms: Schwalbach and Grasshoff, for example, estimate 
elasticities of about 0.06 with respect to performance and 0.18 with respect to size. 
The  effects  of  ownership  structure  on  the  level  of  managerial  compensation  in   4 
Germany have been investigated by Schmid and Elston and Goldberg: both studies 
find that more concentrated ownership lowers the level of managerial pay. However, 
the  effects  of  ownership  structure  on  the  sensitivity  of  managerial  pay  to  firm 
performance in Germany have not been studied, and a major objective of this paper is 
to  provide  evidence  on  this  subject.
1  The  effect  of  codetermination  on  the  link 
between  managerial  compensation  and  firm  performance  in  Germany  has  been 
investigated by Gorton and Schmid (2004), who find that this link is significantly 
weaker in firms where employee representatives comprise one half rather than one 
third  of  supervisory  boards.  Our  analysis  of  the  effect  of  codetermination  on  the 
sensitivity  of  managerial  pay  to  firm  performance  yields  a  different  conclusion: 
greater  employee  representation  on  the  supervisory  board  does  not  lower  this 
sensitivity. 
 
  The data used in this paper are derived from a sample of 271 listed German 
firms over the period 1989-93, and are described in section 4. The empirical analysis 
is presented in sections 5 and 6, and shows that, although the elasticity of managerial 
pay  with  respect  to  firm  profitability  is  very  low,  it  is  affected by the ownership 
structure of the firm, and varies by type of largest owner. It also shows that the WLP 
is inadequate as a basis for assessing the effects of ownership on managerial pay, 
which  casts  serious  doubt  on  its  widespread  use  in  analyses  of  ownership  and 
corporate governance. The conclusions of the paper are set out in section 7. 
 
 
2 The implications of the German corporate governance system for managerial 
pay 
 
All listed German firms have both a supervisory and a management board. 
The  main  function  of  the  former  is  to  control  the  latter.  Responsibility  for  the 
operation of the firm rests with the management board, whose members cannot also 
serve on the supervisory board. The management board is appointed and dismissed by 
the supervisory board, which also determines the pay of the managers, although the 
details of managerial contracts and remuneration are often delegated to a special sub-
                                                 
1 Kaplan (1994) examines whether the relationship between turnover of the managerial board and firm 
performance in Germany might be affected by the ownership structure of the firm, but finds no such 
evidence.   5 
committee  of  the  supervisory  board.  For  the  time  period  considered  in this paper 
(1989-1993),  the  Aktiengesetz  (Stock  Corporation  Act)  specified  explicitly  that 
performance-related remuneration for members of the management board should be 
linked to the annual book profit of the firm.
2 Until the middle of the 1990s, this 
requirement  had  the  effect  of  limiting  pay  for  performance  in  German  firms  to 
bonuses which depended on accounting profits: share options were essentially non-
existent  as  a  component  of  managerial  remuneration  in  the  period  under 
consideration.
3 Because of this clear statement in the Aktiengesetz, we use the return 
on equity (ROE), defined as the net profit in a year as reported in the accounts divided 
by the book value of equity capital in the previous year, as the relevant measure of 
firm performance in our empirical analysis.  
 
In almost all cases, codetermination laws require the supervisory board to be 
composed of members elected separately by the owners and the employees of the 
firm.
4  There  are  three  different  forms  of  codetermination.  Under  Montan 
codetermination, which applies to certain coal and steel firms, the supervisory board 
has equal numbers of owner and employee representatives, together with a neutral 
member to break ties. A Montan firm also has a labour director on its management 
board, who (in contrast to the other members of the management board) cannot be 
appointed if a majority of the employee representatives on the supervisory board vote 
against the appointment. For firms not subject to Montan codetermination and having 
2,000  or  more  employees,  there  are  equal  numbers  of  owner  and  employee 
representatives  on  the  supervisory  board.  In  these  firms,  the  chairman  of  the 
supervisory board, who is elected either by a two-thirds majority or, if such a majority 
cannot be achieved, by the shareholder representatives alone, can cast a second vote 
to  break  ties.  Such  firms  are  also  required  to  have  a  labour  director  on  the 
                                                 
2 § 86 of the Aktiengesetz stated that (authors’ translation):  
(1) The members of the management board can be awarded a participation in the profits in return for 
their activity. This should as a rule consist of a share of the annual profits of the company. 
(2) If the members of the management board are awarded a share in the annual profits of the company, 
then the share is calculated according to the annual net profit, less an accumulated deficit from the 
preceding year and the amounts out of the annual net profit which, according to law or ordinance, are 
to be placed in retained earnings. Any stipulations to the contrary are null and void.  
3 § 86 of the Aktiengesetz was increasingly disregarded by large German companies from the middle of 
the 1990s (see Schwalbach 2001). It was deleted from the corporate code in 2002 by the Transparenz- 
und Publizitätsgesetz (Law on transparency and publicity). 
4  Certain  types  of  firm  are  exempt  from  the  requirement  to  have  employee  representatives  on  the    
supervisory board, but the firms analysed in this paper all have employee representatives.    6 
management  board,  but  this  director  can  be  appointed  even  if  a  majority  of  the 
employee  representatives  on  the  supervisory  board  vote  against  the  appointment. 
Finally, for firms not subject to Montan codetermination and having fewer than 2,000 
employees, one third of the supervisory board consists of employee representatives, 
and there is no requirement for a labour director to be on the management board. 
 
The ownership of listed German firms is highly concentrated. We were able to 
obtain information about the voting rights held by the largest and the second-largest 
owner  in  271  listed  German  firms  at  the  end  of  1991.
5  This  sample  (which  is 
described fully in section 4) contains only 16 firms that do not have an identifiable 
largest owner. We treat these 16 firms as widely-held and set the voting rights of their 
largest owner to zero. The mean value of the voting rights controlled by the largest 
owner of the 271 firms in our sample is 58.23%, while the median value is 54.72%. 
Of these firms, 86% have a largest owner controlling 25% or more of the voting 
rights. 95 of the firms in our sample also have an identifiable second-largest owner: 
the mean value of the voting rights controlled by this owner, conditional on these 
being positive, is 20.75%, and the median value is 24.0%. This highly-concentrated 
ownership structure appears to give the owners of most listed German firms strong 
incentives to monitor the management to ensure that it acts in the interests of owners. 
Whether greater ownership concentration strengthens or weakens the link between 
managerial pay and firm performance is not obvious a priori. Greater monitoring of 
managers by owners might reduce the need for managers to be given incentives to act 
in  owners’  interests  by  having  their  pay  linked  to  firm  performance.  However, 
according  to  the  Bertrand-Mullainathan-Bebchuk-Fried  view,  greater  ownership 
concentration  should  strengthen  the  link  between  managerial  pay  and  profitability 
because large owners are complements to, not substitutes for, such a link. 
 
It is also not obvious how codetermination should be expected to affect the 
sensitivity of managerial pay to firm performance. Employees may be in a particularly 
good  position  to  monitor  managers,  but  whether  the  presence  of  employee 
representatives on the body that determines managerial pay should be expected to 
                                                 
5 We used three sources to obtain this ownership information: the Hoppenstedt Aktienführer, “Wer 
gehört  zu  wem”  published  by  Commerzbank,  and  “Wegweiser  durch  deutsche  Unternehmen” 
published by  Bayerische Hypobank.    7 
strengthen  or  weaken  the  link  between  managerial  pay  and  firm  performance  is 
subject to the same ambiguity that applies to the effect of large owners on this link. 
Gorton and Schmid (2004) suggest that employees may have different objectives to 
those of the owners of a firm, so that greater influence of employee representatives on 
the supervisory board may weaken the pay-performance link, or even lead it to be 
negative. These authors find evidence that managerial pay is positively related to the 
ratio of the market to book value of equity in firms where employee representatives 
comprise one third of the supervisory board, but negatively related to this ratio in 
firms with equal representation of owners and employees on the supervisory board.  
 
Our empirical analysis investigates the effects of both ownership structure and 
the  extent  of  codetermination  on  the  link  between  managerial  pay  and  firm 
profitability. An analysis of the effects of ownership structure on the pay-profitability 
relationship requires us to consider how to measure firm ownership, especially in the 
case of pyramid ownership structures. So the next section discusses the appropriate 
measurement of firm ownership structure. 
 
 
3 Alternative approaches to the measurement of firm ownership structures 
 
A striking feature of the ownership structure of many listed German firms is 
the importance of pyramids: cases in which the owner of a firm exercises control via a 
chain of other firms. In our sample of 271 firms, 90 of the identifiable largest owners 
are other firms that in turn have one or more large owners. In some cases the latter  
are other firms that have large owners, which may also be firms with large owners, 
and  so  on.  The  general  importance  of  pyramid  ownership  structures  has  been 
emphasised  by  La  Porta  et  al.  (1999).  That  paper  has  given  rise  to  a  substantial 
literature which takes for granted that the appropriate way to deal with pyramids is to 
trace ownership through the pyramid structure and identify the ultimate ownership of 
the firm.
6 The ultimate owners of a firm are the owners revealed by investigating the 
ownership of the immediate or first-tier owners, followed by the second-tier owners, 
and so on until all tiers have been exhausted.  
                                                 
6 This literature includes Claessens et al. (2000), (2002), Faccio et al. (2001), and Faccio and Lang 
2002   8 
Although it is perfectly reasonable in principle to regard the ultimate owners 
of a firm as the relevant ones, there is an important practical problem in measuring the 
ultimate ownership of a firm, which is that no clear theoretical basis for so doing 
exists. The literature that has developed from La Porta et al. (1999) uses the approach 
to  measurement  of  ultimate  ownership  introduced  in  that  paper:  the  weakest-link 
principle (WLP). This principle assigns control rights to an ultimate owner on the 
basis of the minimum value of voting rights across the different links of a control 
chain. Thus, if an ultimate owner has 40% of the voting rights in firm A, and firm A 
has 20% of the voting rights in firm B, this owner has control rights of 20% in firm B 
according to the WLP. Despite its popularity in empirical studies, the WLP lacks a 
theoretical underpinning and can give rise to arbitrary and counter-intuitive rankings 
of ultimate owners.
7 One particular problem with the WLP as it has been used in 
many applications concerns its treatment of firms with two or more ultimate owners: 
in such cases control is assigned “to the shareholder with the largest … voting stake”.
8 
Simply dismissing the existence of more than one ultimate owner with significant 
control  rights  is  not  satisfactory,  because  many  firms  have  more  than  one  large 
owner.
9 Not all users of the WLP have followed La Porta et al. in ignoring all large 
owners except the largest, but the absence of a theoretical foundation for the WLP 
means  that  there  is  no  clear  basis  for  measuring  the  control  rights  of  other  large 
owners using this principle. 
 
An alternative approach to the measurement of the control rights of ultimate 
owners of firms is based on the Shapley-Shubik voting power index (SSI). The SSI 
makes a voter’s power proportional to the number of times that the voter is pivotal in 
a  sequential  coalition  of  voters,  i.e.,  the  number  of  times  that  voter  changes  a 
sequential coalition from a losing to a winning one by entering it. If there are three 
voters (1, 2 and 3) and two votes are required to win, then there are six sequential 
coalitions containing all three players, as follows: {1,2,3}, {1,3,2}, {2,1,3}, {2,3,1}, 
{3,1,2}, {3,2,1}. The pivotal voter in each coalition is, respectively, 2, 3, 1, 3, 1, 2. 
The SSI for a particular voter is the number of times that voter is pivotal divided by 
                                                 
7 See Edwards and Weichenrieder (2004) for a discussion of the weaknesses of the WLP. 
8 La Porta et al. (1999), page 478, definition of widely-held. 
9 Faccio et al. (2001) use the WLP and a threshold value of 20 per cent for voting rights to identify the 
largest ultimate owner in firms in their sample. They find that 45.3 per cent of the European firms in 
their sample with such a controlling owner had another ultimate owner with at least 10 per cent of the 
voting rights.   9 
the number of times all voters are pivotal. In this example, there are six sequential 
coalitions and hence six pivotal voters in total. Each individual voter is pivotal twice, 
so each voter has a SSI of 33.33%. Edwards and Weichenrieder (2004) show that it is 
straightforward to apply the SSI to the measurement of the voting power of ultimate 
owners of firms. In the example used to illustrate the WLP above, the voting power in 
firm B of its ultimate owner can be expressed as the product of the SSI representing 
the ultimate owner’s voting power in firm A and the SSI that represents firm A’s 
voting power in firm B. A particular advantage of the SSI approach is that, in contrast 
to the WLP, it provides a clear and straightforward basis for measuring the control 
rights of any number of large owners. 
 
Although the SSI-based approach to the measurement of ultimate ownership 
offers  various  advantages  over  the  WLP,  the  absence  of  an  accepted  theory  of 
pyramid ownership means that there is still no clear theoretical foundation for any 
measure  of  ultimate  ownership  of  firms.
10  In  these  circumstances,  an  alternative 
approach to the measurement of firm ownership is to give up any attempt to look 
through pyramid ownership structures and focus instead on first-tier ownership, with 
pyramids  treated  as  one  of  several  different  types  of  first-tier  owner.  Even  if 
ownership is measured at the first tier rather than the ultimate level, there is still a 
strong case for measuring the control rights of first-tier owners by the SSI rather than 
by their voting rights, because an owner’s power to determine the outcome of a vote 
by all owners is not, in general, accurately reflected by that owner’s voting rights, as 
the  extensive  literature  on  voting  power  indices  has  shown  (see  Felsenthal  and 
Machover 1998). As well as measuring firm ownership at the ultimate level using the 
WLP (UTWL) and the SSI (UTSSI), we therefore also measure firm ownership at the 
first-tier level using voting rights (FTVR) and the SSI (FTSSI).  
 
Table 1 shows the control rights of the largest and second-largest owners of 
the  271  firms  in  our  sample  according  to  the  four  different  measures.  Since  our 
application of the WLP follows that of its originators (La Porta et al. 1999), there is 
no UTWL measure of the control rights of second-largest owners. It is clear from  
  
                                                 
10 Almeida and Wolfenzon (2005) have made a start on the development of a theory of pyramid 
ownership.   10 
Table 1: Alternative measures of control rights of largest owners in sample of 271 
listed German firms, 1991 
 
  Ownership measure 
Per cent  FTVR  FTSSI  UTWL  UTSSI 
  Largest  Second- 
largest 
Largest  Second- 
largest 
Largest  Largest  Second- 
largest 
100  13  0  184  0  12  156  0 
>75 - <100  80  0  7  0  53  11  0 
>50 - 75  89  0  10  0  98  13  0 
>25 - 50  52  35  36  11  55  41  9 
>0 - 25  21  60  18  40  37  34  57 
0  16  176  16  220  16  16  205 
 
Notes. The ownership measures are as follows: FTVR is first-tier ownership based on voting 
rights, FTSSI is first-tier ownership based on the Shapley-Shubik index, UTWL is ultimate 




Table 1 that the main difference between the various ownership measures stems from 
whether  ownership  is  measured  by  voting  rights  (FTVR  and  UTWL)  or  the  SSI 
(FTSSI  and  UTSSI).  The  latter  measures  suggest  that  largest  owners  have  much 
greater control rights than do the former, with roughly 60% of largest owners having 
complete control of the firm under the SSI measures compared to about 4% under the 
voting rights measures. Correspondingly, the FTVR measure suggests that second-
largest owners are more numerous than is indicated by either the FTSSI or UTSSI 
measures, although this difference is not great. Neither general approach to ownership 
measurement shows much impact of tracing ownership through pyramids, but both 
suggest  that  the  control  rights  of  the  largest  owner  are  somewhat  reduced  when 
ownership is measured at the ultimate rather than the first-tier level. It is worth noting 
that the UTSSI measure identifies a second-largest owner in 24% of the firms, and 
also  that  more  firms  have  second-largest  owners  according  to  this  measure  than 
according to the FTSSI measure. 
 
  The argument that a large owner of a firm has strong incentives to monitor the 
firm’s  management  implicitly  assumes  that  the  large  owner  is  an  individual  or  a   11 
family, since in such cases there is a clear relationship between the wealth of the  
owner and the profitability of the firm. This is not obviously the case when the large 
owner is an organisation controlled by agents. There may be no direct link between 
the interests of the agents who run this organisation and the profitability of the firm in 
question. If the incentives of the agents who control large owners of this type are not 
linked  to  firm  profitability,  then  there  may  be  little  incentive  for  such  owners  to 
devote effort to monitoring management.  
 
Many of the largest owners of the firms in our sample are not individuals or 
families, as Table 2 shows. Table 2 distinguishes seven different categories of first-
tier  largest  owner,  and  six  different  categories  of  ultimate  largest  owner.  The 
difference arises because one of the first-tier ownership categories is that of pyramid, 
i.e., a closely-held firm. Tracing through the pyramid to obtain ultimate ownership 
eliminates this ownership type. The other ownership types in Table 2 are widely-held 
domestic  financial  institutions,  foreign  firms,  public-sector  bodies,  widely-held 
domestic non-financial firms and cooperatives, families (including foundations set up 
by families) with a member of the firm’s management board having the same surname 
as  the  family,  and  families  (including  foundations  set  up  by  families)  without  a 
member of the firm’s management board having the same surname as the family. We 
amalgamate widely-held domestic non-financial firms and cooperatives because there 
are very small numbers of each in our sample and these two organisational forms are 
similar, both being producers with dispersed ownership. The distinction between the 
two types of family ownership was made because of the possibility that the effect of 
family ownership on the monitoring of management depends on whether a family 
member is on the firm’s management board. A family that is not actively involved in 
management is likely to want the firm to be run in such a way as to yield maximum 
profits, but if a family is involved in management it is possible that some of the return 
on its ownership stake is taken in the form of consumption of private benefits of 
control. In this latter case, it is not obvious that family ownership will strengthen the 
link between managerial pay and firm profitability. Of course it is possible that a 
family member with a different surname is on the management board, so this measure 
of active family involvement in management is not perfect, but it is the best available. 
 
   12 
Table 2: Number of firms with different types of largest owner by ownership measure 
in sample of 271 listed German firms, 1991 
Owner Type  First-tier 
measures 
UTWL  UTSSI 
Family on management 
board 
37  37  37 
Family not on management 
board 
61  92  94 
Widely-held domestic 
financial institution 
9  33  32 
Pyramids  90  -  - 
Widely-held domestic non- 
financial firm or cooperative 
10  17  17 
Foreign firm  27  38  37 
Public-sector body  17  38  38 
Widely-held  16  16  16 
 
 
  As the figures in Table 2 show, there is no difference between the numbers of 
largest first-tier owners of various types according to whether ownership is measured 
by voting rights or the SSI, but there are small variations in the numbers of different 
largest ultimate owners according to the measure used. The proportional increase in 
the numbers of different types of largest owner consequent on the elimination of the 
pyramid category by changing focus from first-tier to ultimate ownership is greatest in 
the case of domestic financial institutions and public-sector bodies. Families in total 
account for 38% of all first-tier largest owners and 51% of all ultimate largest owners, 
but this means that a very substantial proportion of the largest owners of the firms in 
our sample are organisations run by agents, for which the incentive to devote effort to 
monitoring the management of the firms they own is not clear-cut. This point is given 
careful attention in Section 6 on the empirical analysis of the effects of ownership on 
the link between managerial pay and firm profitability.    13 
4 The Data 
 
Our sample consists of 1145 observations on 271 listed non-financial German 
firms obtained by combining data from several sources. As has been noted in section 
2,  we  collected  information  on  the voting rights of the largest and second-largest 
owners  of  these  firms  at  the  end  of  1991.  To  this  we  added  balance  sheet  and 
profitability information for the years 1989-1993.
11 Finally we added remuneration 
data for the years 1998-1993, which was provided to us by Kienbaum, a German 
consulting  firm  that  specializes  in  managerial  remuneration  policies.  Kienbaum's 
yearly remuneration reports contain the total amount paid to the management board 
and the average number of management board members during a financial year. It is 
not possible to obtain any information about the compensation of individual members 
of the management board in the period 1989-93. The Kienbaum reports also include 
information about the size of the supervisory board. The 271 firms for which we were 
able to collect all the relevant pieces of information comprise a large fraction of the 
total of 563 German firms (including financial firms) that were listed in 1991.  
 
  Panel A of Table 3 contains descriptive statistics for the 1145 observations in 
our dataset. There is a very high degree of dispersion in the distributions of ROE and 
total assets (our measure of firm size). The distribution of the former is negatively 
skewed, while that of the latter is positively skewed. 16% of the observations have a 
negative ROE, and ROE is less than –100% in 13 cases, with its minimum value 
being –364%. There are five observations where ROE is greater than 100%, and the 
maximum value of ROE is 181%. The positive skewness of the distribution of total 
assets is reflected in the positive skewness of the distributions of management board 
remuneration per head, management board size and supervisory board size, although 
the degree of skewness in the distributions of these other variables is less pronounced. 
Panel B of Table 3 shows the codetermination status of the 271 firms in our sample. 
In  a  majority  of  cases,  employee  representatives  comprise  only  one  third  of  the 
supervisory board, and there are only four firms in our sample that are subject to 
Montan codetermination. 
 
                                                 
11 This was taken from several issues of Hoppenstedt Aktienführer.    14 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
A. For 1145 observations 
  Mean  Median  Standard deviation  Skewness 
Remuneration per head  
(euros)  
279,190  239,285  178,934  1.81 
ROE   0.0509  0.0736  0.2730  -3.90 
Total assets (thousand euros)  1,689,362  176,847  5,116,186  5.08 
Management  
board size 
3.72  3  2.37  2.68 
Supervisory 
board size 
10.27  9  5.37  0.57 
B. For 271 firms 
  Number of firms  Percentage of firms 
Codetermination 1/3  159  58.67 
Codetermination 1/2  108  39.85 
Codetermination Montan  4  1.48 
 
 
5 Empirical estimates of a simple model of managerial pay 
 
We  begin  our  empirical  analysis  by  investigating  the  relationship  between 
managerial pay and firm profitability without considering whether this link is affected 
by ownership structure. The basic model we estimate is 
T t N i b a SB MB ASSETS ROE C it t i it it it it it ,..., 1 , ,..., 1 , ln ln 4 3 2 1 = = + + + + + + = e b b b b
 
where  C  denotes  per  capita  remuneration  of  the  management  board,  ASSETS  the 
balance sheet figure for the total assets of a firm, MB the size of the management 
board, SB the size of the supervisory board, ai a firm fixed effect and bt a time fixed 
effect. The ASSETS variable is included as a measure of firm size, and is expected to 
have a positive effect on managerial pay. Management board size is included as an 
explanatory variable to allow for the possibility that total managerial pay is not simply   15 
proportional  to  board  size.  Supervisory  board  size  is  included  as  an  explanatory 
variable because a number of studies have found that the size of the managerial pay-
setting committee affects pay. 
 
Equation  (4.1)  in  Table  4  shows  the  results  obtained  when  this  model  is 
estimated on the full sample of 1145 observations by least squares (LS hereafter), 
with standard errors that are robust to cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and within-
firm serial correlation. Although firm size is estimated to have a significantly positive 
effect on pay, and management board size a significantly negative one, the estimated 
effect of profitability on managerial pay is not significantly different from zero even 
at the 0.10 level. However, the estimated effect of profitability on pay in (4.1) is 
strongly  influenced  by  the  observation  with  a  value  of  –364%,  as  is  shown  by 
equation  (4.2),  which  reestimates  the  model  with  this  observation  excluded.  The 
estimated coefficient of ROE has now almost doubled in size and is significant at the 
0.01 level, while there are only modest changes in the estimated effects of the other 
three variables. But, although the estimated coefficient of ROE in equation (4.2) is 
statistically  significant,  it  corresponds  to  an  effect  on  managerial  pay  that  is  very 
small.  Evaluated  at  the  sample  mean  value  of  ROE,  the  estimate  of  0.25246 
corresponds to an elasticity of managerial pay with respect to profitability of only 
0.0137.  
 
A possible problem with using LS to estimate our basic model of managerial 
pay  is  that  profitability  may  be  correlated  with  the  error  term  in  the  regression. 
Suppose, for example, that firm profitability is partly the result of managerial quality 
(an unobserveable variable), and managerial pay is correlated with managerial quality. 
Then the LS estimate of the coefficient of the profitability variable in the regression 
will be biased and not show the causal effect of firm profitability on managerial pay. 
We used profitability and dividend per share lagged one year as instrumental variables 
in order to assess the extent of this possible bias in the LS estimate of profitability in 
the  managerial  pay  regression.  The  null  hypothesis  that  there  is  no  statistically 
significant  difference  between  the  instrumental  variables  and  LS  estimates  of  our  
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Table 4: Alternative estimates of the simple relationship between managerial pay and 
firm profitability. 
 
Dependent variable: log remuneration per capita 
Equation number  4.1  4.2  4.3 
Estimation method  LS  LS  LAV 
Explanatory variables       
ROE  0.13570  0.25246***  0.22422*** 
  (0.11319)  (0.05551)  (0.05003) 
Ln(Assets)  0.19964***  0.20089***  0.17892*** 
  (0.05719)  (0.05387)  (0.05095) 
MB size  -0.07558***  -0.06824***  -0.06177*** 
  (0.01887)  (0.01659)  (0.01302) 
SB size  0.01503  0.01685  0.00505 
  (0.01158)  (0.01155)  (0.00695) 
R
2 (within)  0.1218  0.1552  0.1126 
Observations  1145  1144  1145 
 
Notes: (a) Equations (4.1) and (4.3) use all observations while equation (4.2) drops one 
observation with profitability of –364% as described in the text. (b) *** denotes significance 
at the 0.01 level. (c) Bracketed figures are standard errors. In equations (4.1) and (4.2) these 
are robust to cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and within-firm serial correlation, while in 
equation (4.3) they are bootstrapped. (d) All equations contained a full set of time and firm 
dummies, the coefficients of which are not reported. (e) The R
2 (within) measure reported for 
equation (4.3) is the squared correlation between the predicted and the actual values of the 
time-demeaned dependent variable. 
 
 
basic regression model was not rejected by a Hausman test.
12 For the remainder of the 
paper, therefore, we maintain the hypothesis that profitability is uncorrelated with the 
error term in the regressions we estimate. 
 
It is clear from equations (4.1) and (4.2) that the LS estimates of our basic 
regression model are strongly influenced by a single outlying value of profitability. 
                                                 
12 We lost 99 observations as a result of using lagged profitability and dividend per share as 
instruments, including the observation with ROE=-364%. The instruments were both individually 
significant at the 0.05 level in the first-stage regression, and the value of the F statistic for their joint 
significance in the first-stage regression was 4.97. The overidentifying restriction that, conditional on 
one instrument being uncorrelated with the error in the regression, the other is also uncorrelated, was 
not rejected.   17 
While  it  may  be  justifiable  to  drop  this  observation, it is unlikely to be the only 
outlier. Rather than devoting a lot of effort to identifying all possible outliers, an 
alternative  approach  is to use methods of estimation that are less sensitive to the 
presence of outliers than is LS. The case for using robust estimators is strengthened 
by the fact that the Bera-Jarque test for normality of the true disturbances computed 
using the residuals from regression equations (4.1) and (4.2) strongly rejects the null 
hypothesis  of  normality  in  both  cases.  When  the  disturbances  are  not  normally 
distributed,  the  LS  estimator  is  not  efficient,  and  robust  regression  methods  of 
estimation and inference are more efficient than least squares. 
 
  Equation (4.3) in Table 4 shows the results of estimating our basic regression 
model of managerial pay using all 1145 observations by least absolute values (LAV), 
a robust regression method which minimises the sum of the absolute values of the 
residuals.  This  method  estimates  the  effects  of  the  explanatory  variables  on  the 
conditional median of the dependent variable rather than the conditional mean. By 
comparison with LS, the parameter estimates obtained by LAV are robust to outliers 
because  the  effect  of  large  residuals  on  these  estimates  is  relatively  smaller:  LS 
attaches more importance to large residuals because each residual is squared. The 
standard errors reported for equation (4.3) are obtained using bootstrapped resampling 
with 200 replications. The point estimate of the effect of profitability on managerial 
pay in (4.3) is similar, though not identical, to that in (4.2) and it is significant at the 
0.01 level. The LAV estimate of the effect of the size variable in (4.3) is somewhat 
smaller than the corresponding estimates in (4.1) and (4.2), while the LAV estimate of 
the effect of supervisory board size has fallen by two-thirds compared with the LS 
ones. These results suggests that the problems of using LS to estimate the simple 
model of managerial pay in this section are not restricted to outliers in the profitability 
observations. In the next section, we therefore use both LS and LAV to estimate the 
effects of ownership structure and codetermination on the link between managerial 
pay and firm profitability.   18 
6 Empirical estimates of the effect of ownership structure and codetermination 
on the sensitivity of managerial pay to profitability  
 
We now extend the analysis of the previous section to consider whether the 
relationship between managerial pay and profitability is affected by the ownership 
structure of the firm and the extent of co-determination in it. To investigate the effect 
of ownership structure, we estimated four regression models corresponding to the four 
different  ownership  measures  discussed  in  section  3.  In  each  model,  denoted 
respectively as the FTVR, FTSSI, UTWL and UTSSI models, the log of remuneration 
per  capita  is  regressed  on  ROE  and  variables  that  are  constructed  by  interacting 
measures of the control rights of the largest and second-largest owners of the firm in 
1991 (CR1 and CR2 henceforth) with the firm’s ROE in each of the five years from 
1989-93. Note that, since we adopt the La Porta et al. version of the WLP, there is no 
measure of CR2 in the UTWL model. 
 
Our empirical analysis requires the assumption that ownership in 1991 (the 
one year for which we have detailed information on ownership) is constant over the 
five-year  period  1989-93  for  which  we  have  data  on  the  other  variables  in  the 
regression models. In the absence of data on ownership in other years, this assumption 
cannot be tested, but there is some support for it in the finding of Gorton and Schmid 
(2004, page 875) that the ownership structure of the largest 250 listed non-financial 
German firms is very stable over exactly the period 1989-93.
13 Since our ownership 
measures do not vary over time, it is not possible for us to estimate any effects of 
ownership on the level of managerial pay using a fixed-effects model: we can only 




  Since, as discussed in section 3, it is not obvious that all types of largest owner 
have  the  same  incentives  to  monitor  management,  we  used  dummy  variables  for 
different  types  of  largest  owners  to  allow  the  effect  of  ownership  on  the  pay-
profitability link to differ by type of largest owner. The ownership types distinguished 
                                                 
13 Gorton and Schmid find that control in the firms in their sample changes , on average, once every 17 
years. 
14 Hausman tests consistently rejected the random effects specification, which would allow estimates of 
the effects of ownership on the level of managerial pay.   19 
in the first-tier ownership models were widely-held domestic financial firms (Fin), 
widely-held domestic non-financial firms or cooperatives (Firm), public sector bodies 
(Pub), domestic firms that had an identifiable large owner and thus formed part of a 
pyramid (Pyr), foreign owners (For), and two types of family ownership according to 
whether there was (FamOn) or was not (FamOff) a member of the management board 
with  the  same  surname  as  the  family.  In  the  ultimate-tier  ownership  models,  the 
pyramid  category  disappeared  because  firms  owned  as  part  of  a  pyramid  were 
assigned to ultimate owners in one of the other six categories.  
 
  Our information about codetermination status is also for the single year 1991, 
and  we  assume  that  codetermination  status  is  constant  over  1989-93.  Any  errors 
introduced by this assumption are small. To investigate the effects of codetermination 
on the relationship between managerial pay and profitability, we interacted ROE with 
dummy variables indicating the proportion of a firm’s supervisory board members 
made up by employee representatives. This proportion can take three values: one half 
(Codet1/2),  10/21  for  coal  and  steel  companies  (CodetMontan), or one third. The 
category excluded was that with one third of the supervisory board being employee 
representatives, so each model estimated included two ROE-employee representation 
interactive variables. 
 
Since it is easier to own a large fraction of a small firm than to own a similar 
fraction of a large firm, ownership concentration tends to be negatively correlated 
with firm size. To rule out the possibility that any influence of ownership structure on 
pay-profitability  sensitivity  might  simply  reflect  a  size  effect,  we  also  included  a 
variable that interacts ROE with our firm size measure, Ln(Assets). The proportion of 
supervisory board members who are employee representatives is correlated with firm 
size, so including a firm size-ROE interactive term also ensures that any impact of the 
ROE-codetermination  interaction  terms  does  reflect  a  genuine  effect  of 
codetermination on the sensitivity of pay to profitability. We also included variables 
that  interact  ROE  with  the  size  of  the  management  board  and  the  size  of  the 
supervisory board. 
 
Each of the four regression models corresponding to the different measures of 
ownership was estimated by two different methods: LS and LAV. The case for using   20 
the LAV estimator is that the Bera-Jarque test for normality of the true disturbances 
computed using the residuals from the models estimated by LS strongly rejects the 
null hypothesis of normality in all cases. Since there are eight regressions that might 
be discussed, it is useful to consider the results of non-nested tests that attempt to 
identify whether there is a preferred ownership measure. Table 5 shows the results, 
for each estimation method, of testing the four models against each other using the J 
test. When the models are estimated by LS (with standard errors that are robust to 
cross-sectional  heteroscedasticity  and  within-firm  serial  correlation),  the  J  tests 
suggest that there is no fully satisfactory model: each of the four is rejected by at least 
one other, although the rejections of the FTVR and UTSSI models are only at the 0.10 
level. However, when the models are estimated by LAV (with bootstrapped standard 
errors), neither the FTVR nor the UTSSI models are rejected by any of the other three 
models. We therefore present results only for the FTVR and UTSSI models in the 
following analysis of the effects of ownership structure and codetermination on the 
sensitivity of managerial pay to profitability. 
 
Table 5: Non-nested tests of alternative regression models 
 
Tested model  Alternative model 
  FTVR  FTSSI  UTWL  UTSSI 
1. Least squares estimates       
FTVR  -  R*  NR  R* 
FTSSI  R**  -  NR  R* 
UTWL  R*  R**  -  R** 
UTSSI  R*  NR  NR  - 
2. Least absolute value estimates     
FTVR  -  NR  NR  NR 
FTSSI  NR  -  NR  R** 
UTWL  R**  R**  -  R* 
UTSSI  NR  NR  NR  - 
 
Notes: Each cell shows the result, for a particular estimation method, of testing the row model 
against the column model by a J test. R indicates that the row model was rejected by the 
column model, and NR indicates that the row model was not rejected by the column model. *, 
** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively.    21 
  One point that emerges very clearly from Table 5 is that the UTWL model is 
wholly  inadequate  as  a  basis  for  assessing  the  effects  of  ownership  on  the  pay-
profitability link. For both estimation methods, the UTWL model is rejected by all the 
other  models,  although  only  at  the  0.10  level  in  two  of  the  six  cases.  This  clear 
rejection of the UTWL model by all other ownership models raises serious questions 
about the very widespread use of the weakest link principle as a basis for empirical 
studies of firm ownership, a matter to which we return in the conclusion of this paper. 
 
  Table  6  shows  the  results  of  estimating  the  FTVR  and  UTSSI  regression 
models by LS and LAV. These results show that the sensitivity of managerial pay to 
firm profitability increases with firm size, other things equal. But the other variables 
that are interacted with ROE typically do not have an effect on managerial pay that is 
significantly  different  from  zero.  The  codetermination  variables  never  have  a 
significant effect on the link between pay and profitability. Although some ownership 
variables have a significant effect on the sensitivity of pay to profitability, the effect  
is often only significant at the 0.10 level, and no ownership variable is estimated to 
have a significant effect on this sensitivity in all four regression equations.  
 
  Given the results in Table 6, it is natural to test the hypotheses that there are 
no effects of ownership or codetermination on the link between managerial pay and 
firm profitability. For all four regression equations in Table 6, the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients of the two codetermination-ROE variables were both zero was not 
rejected. The null hypothesis that the coefficients of all the ownership-ROE variables 
were zero was rejected at the 0.05 level for three of the four equations in Table 6: the 
exception was the FTVR model estimated by LAV, for which this null hypothesis was 
rejected at the 0.10 level. These results suggest that it is worth estimating restricted 
versions of the regression equations in Table 6. The results of doing so are shown in 
Table  7.  The  regressions  reported  in  this  table  incorporate  the  restrictions  (all  of 
which are acceptable at the 0.05 level) that the coefficients of some ownership-ROE 
variables  were  zero,  and  that  the  coefficients  of  the  Codet1/2*ROE  and 
CodetMontan*ROE variables are equal. The interactive variable StrongerCodet*ROE 
in Table 7 is constructed using the dummy variable StrongerCodet, which takes the 
value one if employee representation on the supervisory board is equal to one half or 
10/21.   22 
Table 6: Alternative estimates of a general model of managerial pay 
 
Dependent variable: log remuneration per capita 
Ownership measure  FTVR  UTSSI 
Estimation method  LS  LAV  LS  LAV 
Explanatory variables         
ROE  -1.46556**  -1.39147**  -1.55369***  -1.33640** 
  (0.57167)  (0.55880)  (0.52455)  (0.63899) 
Ln(Assets)  0.18551***  0.15169***  0.18673***  0.12913*** 
  (0.05923)  (0.04179)  (0.05935)  (0.04499) 
Ln(Assets)*ROE  0.17546***  0.17146***  0.18799***  0.17565*** 
  (0.05652)  (0.05621)  (0.05228)  (0.06544) 
MB size  -0.06490***  -0.05844***  -0.06726***  -0.05974*** 
  (0.01712)  (0.01422)  (0.01718)  (0.01407) 
MB size*ROE  -0.08189  -0.07887*  -0.06406  -0.03196 
  (0.04998)  (0.04319)  (0.05028)  (0.04988) 
SB size  0.01456  -0.00105  0.01656  0.00237 
  (0.01348)  (0.00823)  (0.01300)  (0.00840) 
SB size*ROE  -0.02010  -0.01664  -0.02205  -0.02796 
  (0.01764)  (0.01739)  (0.01835)  (0.01994) 
CR1FamOff*ROE  0.02127  -0.13916  -0.17029  -0.33759*** 
  (0.25594)  (0.22262)  (0.15160)  (0.13098) 
CR1FamOn*ROE  0.49355*  0.64243*  0.24315  0.21551 
  (0.27659)  (0.37351)  (0.15077)  (0.27298) 
CR1Firm*ROE  0.26924  0.33313  -0.11864  -0.08759 
  (0.17076)  (0.32148)  (0.19276)  (0.26810) 
CR1Pyr*ROE  -0.11035  -0.05826     
  (0.19758)  (0.20344)     
CR1Fin*ROE  -1.71069**  -2.01477  -0.87570*  -1.10829* 
  (0.81448)  (1.48705)  (0.51621)  (0.56724) 
CR1For*ROE  0.36045  0.47068  0.22142  0.21720 
  (0.26535)  (0.55363)  (0.22040)  (0.43421) 
CR1Pub*ROE  -0.09807  -0.18160  -0.12933  -0.24084 
  (0.24003)  (0.26047)  (0.18024)  (0.16695) 
CR2*ROE  -0.57793  -0.58924*  -0.83321*  -1.06932* 
  (0.40379)  (0.32463)  (0.49922)  (0.62409) 
Codet1/2*ROE  0.20548  0.06202  0.18165  0.13273 
  (0.21913)  (0.16577)  (0.20258)  (0.16739) 
CodetMontan*ROE  0.41924  0.34407  0.28297  0.27698 
  (0.28738)  (0.30687)  (0.23889)  (0.29430) 
R
2 (within)  0.1940  0.1819  0.1947  0.1820 
 
Notes. (a) *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
(b) Bracketed figures are standard errors. For the LS estimates, these are robust to cross-
sectional heteroscedasticity and within-firm serial correlation, while for the LAV estimates 
they are bootstrapped. (c) All equations contained a full set of time and firm dummies, the 
coefficients of which are not reported. (d) The R
2 (within) measure reported for the LAV 
estimates is the squared correlation between the predicted and the actual values of the time-
demeaned dependent variable. 
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  The results in Table 7 show that some forms of ownership do have statistically 
significant effects on the link between pay and profitability, although no ownership 
effect is significant in all four regression equations. According to three of the four 
equations in Table 7, if the largest owner of a firm is a widely-held domestic financial 
institution, then (other things equal) there is a statistically significant reduction in the 
pay-profitability link. This effect is also negative, though not significant, in the fourth 
equation. Similarly, according to three of the four equations, if a firm has a second-
largest owner, then (other things equal) there is a statistically significant reduction in 
the pay-profitability link. In the fourth equation this effect is also negative, though not 
significant.  
 
There are also some effects of family and public-sector ownership on the pay-
profitability link, but these are less clear. The estimates of the FTVR model in Table 7 
show that, for firms with a largest owner that is a family with no member on the 
management  board,  the  pay-profitability  link  is  unaffected  by  the  largest  owner’s 
holding.  For  firms  with  a  largest  owner  that  is  a  family  with  a  member  on  the 
management board, the sensitivity of pay to profitability increases with the largest 
owner’s  holding.  The  estimates  of  the  UTSSI  model  in  Table  7  yield  different 
conclusions. For firms with a largest owner that is a family with a member on the 
management  board,  the  pay-profitability  link  is  unaffected  by  the  largest  owner’s 
holding, but for firms with a largest owner that is a family with no member on the 
management board, the sensitivity of pay to profitability falls with the largest owner’s 
holding. The estimates of the FTVR model show that public-sector largest owners 
have no effect on the pay-profitability link, but the estimates of the UTSSI model 
suggest that the sensitivity of pay to profitability falls with the holding of such largest 
owners, although this latter effect is only significant according to the LAV estimates. 
 
The  results  in  Table  7  provide  almost  no  evidence that stronger employee 
representation  on  the  supervisory  board  strengthens  the  link  between  pay  and 
profitability.  The  estimated  coefficient  of  StrongerCodet*ROE  is  not  statistically 
significant in three of the four regressions, and in the fourth it is only significant at the 
0.10 level. However, it should be noted that the sign of this coefficient is always 
positive. 
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Table 7: Alternative estimates of a restricted model of managerial pay 
 
Dependent variable: log remuneration per capita 
Ownership measure  FTVR  UTSSI 
Estimation method  LS  LAV  LS  LAV 
Explanatory variables         
ROE  -1.34725**  -1.39198***  -1.35265***  -1.16689** 
  (0.56051)  (0.52032)  (0.46631)  (0.57953) 
Ln(Assets)  0.19758***  0.15540***  0.19171***  0.15235*** 
  (0.05738)  (0.04226)  (0.05946)  (0.04500) 
Ln(Assets)*ROE  0.16086***  0.16285***  0.17798***  0.16969*** 
  (0.05645)  (0.05414)  (0.04995)  (0.06085) 
MB size  -0.06513***  -0.06218***  -0.06855***  -0.05699*** 
  (0.01682)  (0.01351)  (0.01729)  (0.01423) 
MB size*ROE  -0.06955  -0.06563*  -0.05847  -0.04261 
  (0.04421)  (0.03813)  (0.04764)  (0.05117) 
SB size  0.01590  0.00284  0.01713  0.00122 
  (0.01312)  (0.00834)  (0.01261)  (0.00855) 
SB size*ROE  -0.01765  -0.01838  -0.02173  -0.02132 
  (0.01557)  (0.01312)  (0.01824)  (0.01765) 
CR1FamOff*ROE  -  -  -0.28088**  -0.46363*** 
  -  -  (0.13094)  (0.12382) 
CR1FamOn*ROE  0.47198**  0.72119**  -  - 
  (0.23824)  (0.31038)  -  - 
CR1Fin*ROE  -1.73327**  -2.27340  -1.06361**  -1.31146** 
  (0.82460)  (1.40837)  (0.50124)  (0.53128) 
CR1Pub*ROE  -  -  -0.22061  -0.35633** 
  -  -  (0.17371)  (0.15411) 
CR2*ROE  -0.61587  -0.59744**  -1.09069**  -1.22495** 
  (0.41498)  (0.29700)  (0.43148)  (0.59310) 
StrongerCodet*ROE  0.22392  0.25361*  0.16134  0.07042 
  (0.17313)  (0.13754)  (0.20651)  (0.14760) 
R
2 (within)  0.1894  0.1810  0.1909  0.1820 
 
Notes. (a) *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
(b) Bracketed figures are standard errors. For the LS estimates, these are robust to cross-
sectional heteroscedasticity and within-firm serial correlation, while for the LAV estimates 
they are bootstrapped. (c) All equations contained a full set of time and firm dummies, the 
coefficients of which are not reported. (d) The R
2 (within) measure reported for the LAV 
estimates is the squared correlation between the predicted and the actual values of the time-
demeaned dependent variable. 
 
  Table 8 shows the relationships implied by the models in Table 7 between the 
sensitivity  of  managerial  pay  to  firm  profitability  and  the  various  corporate 
governance  variables.  The  first  row  of  Table  8  shows,  for  different  estimation 
methods and ownership measures, the estimated coefficient of ROE for a widely-held 
firm that has sample mean values of firm size, management board, supervisory board  
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Table  8:  Alternative  estimates  of  the  effects  of  ownership  and  co-determination  on  the 
managerial pay-profitability relationship 
 
Ownership measure  FTVR  UTSSI 
Estimation method  LS  LAV  LS  LAV 
Effect of:         
1. Widely-held  0.28989***  0.28919***  0.46849***  0.57718*** 
  (0.07365)  (0.05636)  (0.07355)  (0.07581) 
2. FamOff      0.23377**  0.18974*** 
      (0.09950)  (0.06514) 
3. FamOn  0.59357***  0.75322***     
  (0.14510)  (0.19680)     
4. Fin  -0.18436  -0.33283  0.07046  0.08640 
  (0.21995)  (0.38082)  (0.19111)  (0.20041) 
5. Pub      0.30686***  0.31612*** 
      (0.11141)  (0.09925) 
6. Largest  0.31573***  0.33210***  0.31842***  0.34903*** 
  (0.06788)  (0.05627)  (0.05942)  (0.04772) 
7. 2nd largest  0.18792**  0.20810***  0.16315***  0.17465** 
  (0.08351)  (0.05815)  (0.06093)  (0.07342) 
8. Codet 1/3  0.17706**  0.18231***  0.21444***  0.27869*** 
  (0.07525)  (0.06689)  (0.08067)  (0.07409) 
9. StrongerCodet   0.40097***  0.43593***  0.37578***  0.34911*** 
  (0.13603)  (0.10226)  (0.15054)  (0.09575) 
 
Notes. (a) *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. 
(b) Bracketed figures are standard errors. For the LS estimates, these are robust to cross-
sectional heteroscedasticity and within-firm serial correlation, while for the LAV estimates 




15 The LS and LAV estimates of this coefficient in the 
FTVR model are almost identical. However, there is a difference between the LS and 
LAV estimates of this coefficient in the UTSSI model. For both estimation methods 
this effect is substantially larger in the UTSSI than the FTVR model, although even 
the largest coefficient estimate (0.57718) corresponds to an elasticity of only 0.0294 
evaluated at the sample mean value of ROE. Since some forms of largest owner are 
estimated to have no statistically significant effects on the pay-profitability link, the 
estimated coefficient in the FTVR models for widely-held firms also applies to firms 
with largest owners of the following types: widely-held domestic non-financial firms, 
pyramids,  public-sector  bodies,  foreigners  and  families  with  no  members  on  the 
management  board.  Similarly,  the  estimated  coefficient  in  the  UTSSI  models  for 
                                                 
15 A widely-held firm is one in which the largest and second-largest owner’s control rights are both 
zero.   26 
widely-held firms also applies to firms with largest owners of the following types: 
widely-held domestic non-financial firms, foreigners and families with members on 
the management board. 
 
The next four rows of Table 8 show, for alternative estimation methods and 
ownership measures, the estimated coefficient of ROE for firms that have a single 
large owner of different types and sample mean values of firm size, management 
board, supervisory board and co-determination variables. For each type of owner, the 
coefficient was obtained by setting control rights equal to the sample mean value of 
control rights held by largest owners of this type (conditional on these being positive). 
The FTVR model estimates of the coefficient of ROE for largest owners that are 
families with a member on the management board are substantially greater larger than 
those for widely-held firms, but still economically small: the coefficient of 0.75322 
corresponds  to  an  elasticity  of  0.0384  at  the  sample  mean.  The  UTSSI  model 
estimates  of  the  coefficient  of  ROE  for  largest  owners  that  are  families  with  no 
member on the management board are smaller than those for widely-held firms by a 
factor  of  one  half  or  more:  although  it  is  significantly  different  from  zero,  the 
coefficient  of  0.18974  corresponds  to  an  elasticity  of  only  0.00966  at  the  sample 
mean.  For  largest  owners  that  are  widely-held  financial  institutions,  the estimated 
coefficient of ROE is never significantly different from zero, and in the FTVR both 
point estimates are actually negative. The LS and LAV estimates of the coefficient of 
ROE for public-sector largest owners in the UTSSI model are very similar, though 
only the latter is significantly different from the estimate for widely-held firms. 
 
  Rows  6  and  7  of  Table  8  show  how  the  pay-profitability  relationship  is 
affected by the presence of a second-largest owner. In both rows, the control rights of 
all types of largest owner are set equal to their full sample mean values, as are the 
firm size, management board, supervisory board and co-determination variables. Row 
6 shows the estimated coefficient of ROE when the control rights of the second-
largest owner are zero, while row 7 shows the estimated coefficient of ROE when the 
second-largest  owner’s  control  rights  are  set  equal  to  their  sample  mean  value 
(conditional  on  these  being  positive).  The  presence  of  a  second-largest  owner  is 
estimated to reduce the sensitivity of managerial pay to profitability by between a 
third and a half, and in three of the four cases this reduction is statistically significant.    27 
 
  Rows  8  and  9  of  Table  8  show  how  the  pay-profitability  relationship  is 
affected by different degrees of employee representation on the supervisory board. In 
both rows, the control rights of largest and second-largest owners are set equal to their 
full sample mean values, as are the firm size, management board and supervisory 
board variables. Row 8 shows the estimated coefficient of ROE for a firm in which 
employee representatives comprise one third of the supervisory board, while row 9 
shows this coefficient estimate for a firm in which such representatives comprise one 
half or 10/21 of the supervisory board. Although there is very limited evidence that 
the differences are statistically significant, the point estimates consistently show that 
the link between managerial pay and profitability is stronger in firms with stronger 
employee representation on the supervisory board. These results show clearly that 
greater  employee  representation  on  the  supervisory  board  does  not  lower  the 
sensitivity  of  pay  to  profitability,  and  leave  open  the  possibility  that  it  actually 
increases this sensitivity. 
 
  Our  results  about  the  effect  of  greater  employee  representation  on  the 
sensitivity of managerial pay to firm profitability differ from Gorton and Schmid’s 
findings that managerial compensation is positively related to firm performance as 
measured by the ratio of market to book value of equity for firms operating under one 
third codetermination, but negatively related to firm performance so measured for 
firms operating under equal codetermination. The difference between our findings and 
those of Gorton and Schmid may be because we measure firm performance by the 
return on equity, for the reasons given in section 2 above, while Gorton and Schmid 
use the ratio of market to book value of equity. It may also be due to the fact that we 
use  a  parametric  approach  to  estimating  the  effects  of  codetermination  on  pay-
performance  sensitivity,  while  Gorton  and  Schmid  use  a  non-parametric  nearest- 
neighbour approach. Our results show that greater employee representation on the 
supervisory board does not weaken the link between managerial pay and the measure 
of  firm  performance  that  was  specified  in  the  Aktiengesetz  for  the  relevant  time 
period,  namely  accounting  profitability.  Greater  employee  representation  does  not, 
therefore,  necessarily  lead  to  managerial  incentives  that  are  counter  to  owners’ 
interests. 
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  The    results  reported  in  this  section  show  that  the  relationship  between 
managerial pay and firm profitability in listed German firms is influenced by firm 
ownership structure. However, not all types of largest owner affect the link between 
pay  and  profitability.  Furthermore,  the  estimated  effects  of  ownership  on  the 
relationship  between  pay  and  profitability  depend  partly  on  how  ownership  is 
measured.  This is particularly the case for largest owners that are families. If the 
UTSSI measure of ownership is used, then family largest owners with no members on 
the management board lower the sensitivity of pay to profitability, while those with 
family members on the management board do not. These results are consistent with an 
interpretation according to which the monitoring of the management board by largest 
family owners that are not actively involved in the management of a firm allows the 
link between managerial pay and profitability to be weakened, while largest family 
owners  that  are  actively  involved  in  management  do  not  play  the  role  of  outside 
monitors and thus have no effect on the pay-profitability link. However, if the FTVR 
measure of ownership is used, then family largest owners with no members on the 
management board do not affect the sensitivity of pay to profitability, while those 
who have family members on the management board strengthen it. The latter finding 
is contrary to the view that a family actively involved in management is in a position 
to take some of the returns from its ownership stake in the form of private benefits of 
control and thus will weaken the pay-profitability link. A possible explanation of this 
finding  is  that  in  such  firms  the  sensitivity  of  managerial  pay  to  profitability  is 
enhanced in order to ensure that other owners are willing to hold equity in the firm. 
The general point, however, is that, on a purely empirical basis, the FTVR and UTSSI 
models are equally satisfactory, but they yield very different results about the effects 
of family ownership on the pay-profitability link. 
 
  The results reported in this section provide almost no support for the view that 
the presence of large owners is a complement to, rather than a substitute for, a link 
between managerial pay and firm profitability. When ownership structure does have 
an effect on the link between pay and profitability, it is usually to weaken this link. 
The  only  evidence  of  large  owners  strengthening  the  pay-profitability  link  comes 
from  the  FTVR  model  estimates  of  the  effect  of  largest  family  owners  actively 
involved in management. 
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A final point to note about the results reported in this section is the very small 
size of the estimated pay-profitability link in listed German firms. Although there is 
evidence that some forms of ownership change the pay-profitability sensitivity by a 
large proportion of the value taken by this link for widely-held firms, the general level 
of  the  estimated  elasticities  of  managerial  pay  with  respect  to  profitability  is 





This paper has shown that the ownership structure of listed German firms has 
some effect on the sensitivity of managerial pay to firm profitability. However, this 
sensitivity is unaffected by some types of large owners, showing that it is important to  
allow for differences in the effects of different types of owner when analysing the role 
of  ownership  in  corporate  governance.  Furthermore,  the  effects  of  ownership  that 
have  been  found  in  this  paper  mostly  weaken  the  pay-profitability  link,  which  is 
inconsistent with the hypothesis, emphasised in the recent literature on the USA, that 
large owners are a complement to, rather than a substitute for, such a link. The paper 
has also shown that greater employee representation on the supervisory board does 
not lower the sensitivity of managerial pay to firm profitability. 
 
As well as these specific conclusions about the effects of German corporate 
governance  features  on  managerial  remuneration,  the  paper  yields  some  general 
conclusions  about  the  measurement  of  firm  ownership  in  studies  of  corporate 
governance. It has shown that there are several ways in which ownership might be 
measured,  and  that  different  ownership  measures  give  different  results  about  the 
effects of ownership on managerial pay. Four different ownership measures were used 
in the empirical analysis in this paper, of which two (the FTVR and UTSSI measures) 
were equally good and superior to the other two on empirical grounds. However, the 
FTVR and UTSSI measures produced different results concerning the effects of large 
owners on the link between pay and profitability, particularly so in the case of family 
ownership.  The  fact  that  different  ownership  measures  give  different  conclusions 
about the effects of large owners on managerial pay in Germany indicates the need for 
further research that establishes a satisfactory theoretical and empirical basis for the   30 
measurement of firm ownership. The recent interest in the effects of ownership on 
corporate  governance  has  been  pursued  without  much  attention  being  paid  to  the 
question of what is the appropriate way to measure firm ownership. The results of this 
paper show that the conclusions reached about the effects of ownership on corporate 
governance can depend critically on the particular ownership measure used. This is 
highly unsatisfactory, and the question of how to measure firm ownership must be 
addressed  if  the  literature  on  ownership  and  corporate  governance  is  to  make 
progress. 
 
This  paper  has  shown  clearly  that  the  ownership  measure  that  has  been 
extensively used in the recent literature on the economic effects of concentrated firm 
ownership  following  its  introduction  by  La  Porta  et  al.  (1999)  –  that  in  which 
ownership is measured at the ultimate tier of pyramid structures using the weakest-
link principle – is inadequate as a basis for assessing the effects of ownership on 
managerial pay in listed German firms. The version of the WLP that has been used in 
this paper is the one that (following La Porta et al.) only takes account of the largest 
owner of a firm. It is possible that the WLP would perform better if it was extended to 
include second-largest owners, although there is no clear basis on which to do so. 
However, many recent studies have used the La Porta et al. version of the WLP, so 
that  the  present  paper’s  finding  that this version of the WLP is inadequate raises 
serious  questions  about  its  use  in  other  analyses  of  ownership  and  corporate 
governance. This reinforces the general conclusion that further work is required to 
develop  an  empirically  satisfactory  ownership  measure  for  use  in  analyses  of  the 
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